An Agent Model for the Influence of Culture on Bargaining by Hofstede, Gert Jan et al.
An Agent Model for the Influence of Culture on 
Bargaining
 
Gert Jan Hofstede 
Wageningen University 
 Hollandseweg 1 
6706 KN Wageningen 
the Netherlands 
gertjan.hofstede@wur.nl 
 
 
 
Catholijn M. Jonker 
Delft University of Technology 
Mekelweg 4 
2628 CD Delft 
the Netherlands 
c.m.jonker@tudelft.nl 
 
 
 
Tim Verwaart 
LEI Wageningen UR 
 Postbus 29703 
2502 LS den Haag 
the Netherlands 
tim.verwaart@wur.nl 
 
ABSTRACT 
Cross-cultural negotiation poses special challenges. In 
this paper an agent-based simulation model is presented 
that tackles these challenges. The model represents a 
trade network for a good with a hidden quality attribute. 
Agents have culture scripts that are based on Hofstede’s 
dimensions of culture. They have visible group 
membership and status attributes that are used by their 
hidden cultural rules of behaviour. They bargain 
according to the ABMP bargaining model that has a 
utility function consisting of expected gain, quality, and 
risk. The paper presents the model and shows results of 
test runs. These test runs have face validity when 
compared with real negotiations. Formal tests of 
correspondence between the model and the trade game 
on which is it based have yet to be conducted. 
Extensions will make it a useful tool for training traders 
who engage in cross-cultural bargaining. The present 
version is helping to explain the behaviours of actors in 
international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s 
dimensions can be used to generate agents that are 
believable negotiators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anybody with experience in international trade knows 
that bargaining practices differ across the world. 
Multinational companies sometimes work with different 
price lists for different countries: whereas German 
buyers want to know exactly how much the products 
cost, Arabs need to have room for bargaining. In order 
to sell at the same price, the selling company needs to 
adapt its offer to the varying bargaining practices (Jan 
Omvlee, personal communication). 
This means that a single piece of advice about how to 
bargain, or a single model to describe bargaining, are 
obviously not valid across the world unless culture is 
taken into account. 
‘Culture’ is a notion with many meanings, some of 
which are contested in some disciplines. However, the 
leading paradigm today is widely accepted and used in 
both practice and academia. According to it, culture 
refers to the unwritten rules of society. It is a 
phenomenon that is specific to a group, not to an 
individual. And it is transmitted in early youth through 
example and education. 
Within literature various basic dimensions can be found 
according to which societies differ from one another. Of 
these, the most widely used is Hofstede (2001, 2005). 
His work is accessible, sparse, and based on a very 
large, very well stratified sample that continues to give 
it great explanatory value. No other model matches 
society-level variables so well to date (Smith, 2004).  
This paper describes an agent-based model for 
bargaining in the context of trade. The agents follow 
common sense strategies such as maximizing gain, 
seeking good quality, and minimizing risk. But they 
also have models of how to behave in an appropriate 
manner, and these models are based on Hofstede’s five 
dimensions of culture. The challenge that we take up is 
the one posed by de Rosis et al. (2004), who suggested 
to investigate the feasibility of Hofstede’s model for 
building culturally consistent agent characters. An 
agent-based model of bargaining in which the agents are 
cultured offers several promises. It can help understand 
the dynamics of international negotiations in trade. It 
could also serve as a training tool for aspiring 
international traders.  
The paper first briefly introduces Hofstede’s model of 
five dimensions of culture. Next, the negotiation model 
that we adopt is presented: ABMP. We show how this 
model can be used in agent-based simulations. We also 
discuss the limited subset of negotiation situations that 
are considered in this article. In the third section we link 
culture and negotiation by describing the influence of 
each of Hofstede’s dimensions of culture on 
negotiators’ practices and preferences. This section sets 
the scene for the presentation of the rules for our 
cultured agents in the fifth section. Section six shows 
example runs with the model and discusses them. 
Finally we discuss the model and how to proceed, since 
this model forms the basis of future research and tools.   
 
HOFSTEDE’S FIVE DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE 
Each human society has found a different pattern of 
response to the problems of social life. In some 
societies, groups are permanent and close-knit while in 
others, group membership is volatile and voluntary. In 
some, leadership style is usually autocratic and in 
others, participative. Research (Hofstede and Hofstede, 
2005) has shown and repeatedly confirmed that basic 
tendencies to deal with a few central issues of social life 
are stable across the generations in societies. They are, 
because they are instilled into a society’s members from 
birth. As a baby and as a toddler, a child is primed as a 
social being. Once a child sets foot into the wider 
society as a teenager, its basic cultural orientation is 
firmly in place. 
This research stream has led to dimension models of 
culture. One of these is the five-dimension model by 
Hofstede. The five dimensions are about five issues that 
relate to our basic drives. They will be introduced 
briefly in order to use them further on in the text. Note 
that these are not personality traits, but societal patterns! 
Also note that the picture drawn here is necessarily 
simplified. It presents the two caricatured extremes of 
each dimension. In reality, almost all cultures have 
intermediate positions on almost all dimensions. The 
dimensions are introduced in the following sections. 
Collectivism versus individualism  
This dimension is about affiliation. To a collectivist 
mindset, fixed membership of a single group in which 
all members are interdependent is the natural state of 
being human. No member of the natural group can be 
cast aside. This means that maintaining a semblance of 
harmony is crucial.  
To an individualist mindset, on the other hand, self-
sufficiency is the natural state of being. Everybody 
should be judged in the same way, whether or not the 
person is a group member. Honest people speak their 
minds, even if that means open disagreement. 
Hierarchy: large versus small power distance 
This dimension is about dominance as an ascribed 
quality. It has to do with authority as seen from below. 
Are parents, teachers, priests and bosses held in awe, 
and is autocratic leadership expected? Then we have a 
society of large power distance.  
Or is leadership a role that could change from one 
person to another with ease, and are all people equal? In 
that case, the society is one of small power distance.  
Aggression and gender: masculinity vs. femininity 
This dimension is about dominance from above, about 
muscle power, and about the emotional roles of the two 
sexes. In what is called a masculine society, men in 
particular are supposed to be fighters. Women are 
supposed to be cheerleaders to the men’s fight – but 
they have to be tough too. Men are real men and women 
are real women. These are fighting societies, with 
strong-handed police and military and with heavy 
punishment for offenders.  
In what is called feminine societies, both men and 
women are supposed to be peace-loving and consensus 
seeking and their social behaviours are not strongly 
different. Both men and women are people, and gender 
is not supposed to be a big deal. Criminals should be 
helped, not punished. 
Otherness and Truth: uncertainty avoidance  
This dimension is about how to cope with the 
unknowable. Some societies are termed uncertainty 
avoiding. They tend to have strict rules and rituals about 
things that are strange or different, such as religious 
rules and food taboos, or strange sexual practices. In 
these societies, the distinction between clean and dirty is 
important. In fact they feel that any distinction should 
be a sharp one. They are concerned about theory, about 
arguing for its own sake. They like to show their 
emotions, particularly anxiety, verbally and non-
verbally.  
Other societies are termed uncertainty tolerant. They are 
relaxed and curious about strange things and people, 
and not worried about establishing strict classification 
schemes for everything. They value exploratory 
behaviours and novel experiences, and they do not like 
an emotional communication style. 
Short- versus long-term gratification of needs 
This is about all the basic human drives. Which drive 
should get precedence, one that presses now or one that 
might become pressing in ten years?  
Some societies live for today, and these are termed 
short-term oriented. Behaving in an appropriate manner 
and respecting conventions is important in these 
societies, as well as ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ as the 
Americans have it. There are strong opinions about 
good and bad, and these are believed to be immutable. 
Others societies live for the future; these are termed 
long-term oriented. Reasoning is pragmatic, and 
principles are adapted to context. Planning, foresight 
and perseverance are valued. On the downside, this 
could lead to stinginess and calculation. 
Five dimensions, one world 
So far, the dimensions of culture have been isolated 
from one another in an artificial way. In reality, cultures 
have a recognizable feel to them, a Gestalt that can be 
described, albeit only roughly, by its combination of 
dimension scores. The five dimensions are no more than 
abstractions that capture main behavioural trends. 
Cultures have ‘gestalts’ of behaviour. Experienced 
negotiators know the range of behaviours that they can 
expect from negotiators from other parts of the world. 
They also know how gender, age, status and personality 
can affect the negotiation style of people from these 
parts of the world. 
In previous work, Hofstede et al. (2006, 2008, 2008abc) 
the influence of each of the dimensions on trade 
processes was modelled separately; a slightly artificial, 
but also necessary intermediate step in our long term 
research project. Reconciling these dimensional models 
into one believable model that shows the ‘whole 
negotiator’, although still abstracting from personality, 
is the aim of this article. 
 
NEGOTIATION 
In bilateral negotiation, two parties aim at reaching a 
joint agreement. They do so by exchanging various 
offers or bids using e.g. an alternating offers protocol 
(Osborne et al., 1994) called the “negotiation dance” in 
(Raiffa, 2002).  Negotiation is a complex emotional 
decision-making process aiming to reach an agreement 
to exchange goods or services, see e.g., (Thompson, 
2005).  
Agent Models for Negotiation 
The literature on automated negotiation contains a 
number of agent models for negotiation. The focus of 
that literature is on reaching deals that Pareto-efficient 
(i.e., neither can improve without making the situation 
worse for the other). Furthermore, some aim at reaching 
fair outcomes, i.e., in which the deal is equally good for 
both parties. The strategies differ in whether or not they 
take knowledge about the domain, and/or opponent into 
account. Example of strategies that do not use any 
domain or opponent knowledge can be found in (Faratin 
et al., 1998; Jonker et al., 2001). Other strategies try to 
learn the opponent’s preferences, see e.g., (Coehoorn, 
2004; Hindriks et al., 2008). 
Focus on Interpersonal Bargaining 
The present work focuses on a specific type of 
negotiations: two person bargaining about business 
transactions. The work aims to develop models of actual 
human behaviour. It does not aim to develop an optimal 
bargaining strategy that can outperform human 
negotiators or other agents. 
Gaming simulations form the context of the bargaining 
sessions. The gaming simulations are designed as tools 
in supply chains and networks research (Meijer et al., 
2006). Participants negotiate a transaction of a 
commodity with quality attributes that are known to the 
seller and invisible – but testable at some cost – for the 
buyer. The buyer can either trust the seller’s quality 
statement or spend money on testing. So, the relevant 
attributes for comparing bids are the economic value of 
the transaction according to market prices, the valuation 
of particular quality attributes by the trader, and the risk 
of deceit introduced by the information asymmetry.  
In the models developed in this work, traders are 
assumed to compare business proposals by applying a 
utility function as defined by Tykhonov et al. (2008): 
U(b,a,p) = wapPPap(b) + wapQQap(b) + wapRRap(b) (1) 
U(b,a) stands for the utility that agent a expects from 
bid b made by agent p. Pap(b) reflects a’s belief about 
the economic value. Qap(b,a) reflects the subjective 
valuation of the proposed transaction, e.g. an trader may 
prefer trading biologically grown food, even if more 
profit may be made with traditionally grown. Rap(b) 
reflects a’s estimate of the risk involved. It is based on 
the estimated trustworthiness of the other agent and the 
opportunity to defect that the proposal offers, e.g. a 
contract for organically grown food offers the 
opportunity to deliver the cheaper traditionally grown. 
The factors wapP, wapQ, and wapR reflect the weight that 
agent a attaches to the terms of the utility function when 
dealing with p. The values of wapQ and wapR relative to 
wapP  may reflect personal preferences, but they are to a 
great extent influenced by culture. Within a culturally 
homogeneous society, not all agents have equal 
preferences, but significant differences between cultures 
exist in the average values of risk aversion and the 
appraisal of status associated with high quality products. 
ABMP 
For our negotiation strategy we chose that of Jonker and 
Treur (2001), because of its proven similarity to human 
negotiations, see (Bosse et al., 2004). The ABMP 
strategy has a number of parameters, with which the 
behavior of the agent can be tuned. With respect to the 
influence of culture, the relevant ABMP parameters are 
concession factor, negotiation speed, utility gap size, 
and impatience factor. The concession factor determines 
how far the agent is willing to go in making 
concessions. Negotiation speed determines the extent of 
concessions to its own utility the agent would typically 
make per negotiation round. The utility gap size 
expresses what is acceptable to the agent when 
comparing its own bid with that of the opponent. If the 
difference in utility falls within the utility gap size, the 
agent will accept the opponent’s offer. The impatience 
factor determines when the agent becomes impatient 
with the opponent. For example, for some agents it is 
OK if the other makes a concession within 4 rounds, for 
another, the other should make concessions every 
round. The following section explains how culture 
influences these parameters. 
 
CULTURE AND BARGAINING 
Hofstede et al. (2006, 2008, 2008abc) modeled the 
influence of culture on trade processes for each of the 
five dimensions separately. Negotiation is one of the 
trade processes they define. From these papers, the 
narrative descriptions of the influences on trade 
negotiations – i.e. the bargaining about transactions – 
are cited below. 
Masculinity versus femininity 
Hofstede et al. (2006) treat the dimension of masculinity 
versus femininity as a preference for performance 
versus cooperation. A performance oriented trader 
(masculine culture) is interested in fast trades, with as 
many goods as possible in one trade. This trader is 
rather impatient, and if bids are too far off from his 
profile, he will walk away quickly. The performance 
oriented sticks to the contract of the deal, deceive the 
trade partner to the limits of the contract without any 
compunction, and expects the partner to do so too. As a 
consequence, the performance oriented trader sees no 
problems in dealing again with a trader that conned him 
in the past: “It’s all in the game”. Each subsequent 
negotiation will be dealt with without taking past 
trustworthiness into account. Each new contract will be 
set up from scratch. The trader learns from mistakes to 
make sure that the contract will not lead to new and 
uncomfortable surprises on his side. 
A cooperation oriented trader (feminine culture) is 
interested in the relationship with the trade partner; 
building trust is important. The amount of goods is not 
of the most interest, because the relationship built 
during negotiation might pay off in future negotiations. 
Given the interest in the relationship with the trade 
partner, a first negotiation with a trade partner will take 
time that is willingly spent by the trader. During such 
negotiations, the trader appreciates a negotiation process 
in which both partners show a willingness to 
accommodate the other over time. Past negotiations do 
play an important role in subsequent negotiations. The 
trader is perfectly willing to see the current negotiation 
as a kind of continuation of the previous one. If the 
trade is about the same kind of commodity, the trader 
will start the negotiation from the deal of the last one. If 
the other accepts, then the deal can be made in one 
round and in seconds, whereas the first deal might have 
taken a lot of rounds and lots of time. If conned, then 
the cooperation oriented trader will avoid the conman if 
possible, or give him one more chance. In the human 
games we observed that he then asks for a very good 
new deal to reaffirm the relationship.  
Both performance oriented traders and cooperation 
oriented traders prefer reaching a deal after a satisfying 
negotiation over a deal that was reached on the basis of 
a bad negotiation. Not reaching a deal after a satisfying 
negotiation is better than having no deal after a bad 
negotiation. Bear in mind that the traders differ strongly 
in what is considered a satisfying negotiation. 
Furthermore, note that their cultural scripting will also 
lead them to behave differently during the negotiations. 
A performance oriented trader might very well walk 
away (no deal) as soon as he receives a first bid that is 
very far off the expected price. The cooperation oriented 
trader might be put off by steadfastness, and certainly 
by the partner walking away after few rounds. However, 
he will be forgiving and willing to negotiate with P one 
more time, although he will trust less and avoid risk in 
the next deal. 
Uncertainty avoidance 
According to Hofstede et al. (2008), the first bid of an 
uncertainty avoiding trader tends to be modest in the 
sense that it is a price he thinks is right. The uncertainty 
avoiding have an emotional style of negotiation, making 
sure that the opponents understand their feelings (see 
row 2 in table 1). They will not adapt their behaviour to 
their opponent’s. In the bargaining that follows they will 
not easily give in nor will much time be spent. After a 
few unsuccessful iterations, the uncertainty avoiding 
trader will break off the negotiation. 
The uncertainty tolerant traders on the other hand have a 
relaxed style of negotiation. They try to adapt their 
behaviour to their counterparty's, although they are not 
prepared to come to an agreement at all cost. They do 
not show their emotions and may be disconcerted if 
their opponents do. They are careful not be more 
yielding than their counterparts are, not especially 
modest, and are ready to break off negotiations in case 
of insufficient progress. 
Power distance 
According to Hofstede et al. (2008a), traders from 
egalitarian cultures may have different ways to 
negotiate, but they will always negotiate. Traders from 
large power distance cultures on the other hand are not 
used to negotiating seriously. The powerful dictate the 
conditions. The less powerful have to accept. In 
feminine or collectivist cultures the powerful may 
exercise restraint, or the lower ranked may successfully 
plead for compassion, but this is not a common decision 
making process, like a negotiation. The most powerful 
decides. When people from hierarchical cultures are 
forced to negotiate, because they are in a position of 
equal status or trade with foreigners, the negotiations 
often end in a game of power. 
A trader from a culture with large power distance 
expects a lower ranked business partner to accept his 
conditions rapidly. If the lower ranked partner has the 
same cultural background, there is no problem and the 
rights of the higher ranked will be recognized and 
respected: the lower ranked will be modest and give in 
easily. However, a trader from an egalitarian culture 
will not give in to the pressure if his status is lower, but 
will either react furiously (e.g., break off negotiations) 
or simply ignore the pressure (make a counterproposal), 
in which case the opponent will be furious (and e.g., 
break off negotiations).  
If a trader from a culture with large power distance 
negotiates with a foreigner and assumes the foreigner to 
have a higher status, he may give in more easily than the 
foreigner expected. In that case the foreigner will be 
happy, but his opponent will have "left money on the 
table". If both are from hierarchical cultures but do not 
perceive one another’s hierarchical position they may 
make misattributions resulting in one of them being 
dominated or stopping the negotiations. 
Individualism versus collectivism 
According to Hofstede et al. (2008b), to a collectivist 
mindset, negotiation has to be preceded by the 
formation of a relationship. If that goes wrong there will 
be no negotiation. During the negotiation, collectivist 
traders discriminate between in-group and out-group 
partners. They feel obliged to be more modest (or 
realistic, following their in-group's rules) in their first 
proposal to an in-group partner, are more hesitant to 
break off negotiations with in-group partners, and will 
try to maintain harmony as long as the opponent follows 
the in-group rules. When doing business with 
individualist traders the collectivists may be shocked by 
their opponent's explicit communication. Breaking the 
rules asks for a reaction. The style of that reaction may 
be furious, or they might never explicitly say anything, 
but just avoid the other from now on. The first reply to a 
new proposal from an in-group partner will be modest, 
but there is no need to be modest to an out-group 
partner. If an out-group partner replies with no or small 
concession, negotiation is likely to be broken off, where 
an in-group partner or an acquainted relation would get 
a second chance. 
In a collectivist mind the responsibility for in-group 
welfare and the compliance with in-group rules always 
play a prominent role. A collectivist will accept benefits 
for his in-group rather than his personal advantage as a 
convincing argument. 
Individualists have one thing in mind during 
negotiations: their own personal interest. This might be 
the material advantage of the deal in question, or the 
development of new trust relations with perspectives of 
future deals, or just the pleasant conversation during the 
negotiations, or the satisfaction of winning the game, 
but one thing stands for sure: individualists only pursue 
private interests. So individualist traders are not very 
modest in their negotiations, nor will they give in for the 
purpose of maintaining harmony. If they are not aware 
of the cultural differences when trading with 
collectivists, they may be upset by the lack of explicit 
communication, or they may upset their opponents by 
being too explicit, or by talking business before the 
relationship has been established and acknowledged. 
They are not particularly patient or impatient 
negotiators, but behave patiently as long as it serves 
their interest. 
Long term versus short term orientation 
According to Hofstede et al. (2008c), long term oriented 
negotiators are pragmatic and take the bigger picture. 
They tend to see one bargaining instance as a small step 
in a long process, and their decisions will be led by their 
estimation of the profitability or other success chances 
of that longer process. 
Short term oriented negotiators, on the other hand, think 
in terms of moral principles and apply them to the 
situation that is before them here and now. They are 
very reliable when it comes to following standards of 
appropriateness of behaviour, but this can make them 
disregard the ulterior consequences of their actions. 
Long-term oriented traders show patience. They do not 
break off negotiations. They do not overcharge. A first 
proposal may be modest, but they do not rapidly give in. 
Extremely short term traders are impatient. They want 
rapid deals. If they give in they do it quickly and with 
substantial concessions. If partners do not make 
concessions too, they break off easily and try their luck 
elsewhere. 
 
MODELLING CULTURE IN ABMP 
Based on the narrative description in the previous 
section, the influence of the cultural dimensions on 
ABMP parameters can be modelled. The same applies 
to the weight that subjective terms for quality preference 
and risk aversion get in an agent’s utility evaluation. 
The direction of the influences (increasing versus 
decreasing) is indicated in Table 1. Table 1 also presents 
typical parameter values for cultures that are not on the 
extremes of the Hofstede dimensions.  
Table 1: Influence of culture on the utility weight factors and 
ABMP parameters (+ increased parameter value; - decreased; 
+! increased every negotiation round) 
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1)Hier: hierarchical, high value of PDI;  
Egal: egalitarian, low value of PDI; 
U.av: uncertainty avoiding, high value of UAI; 
U.tol: uncertainty tolerant, low value of UAI; 
Indiv: individualist, high value of IND; 
Coll:  collectivist, low value of IND; 
Mas: masculine, performance oriented, high value of MAS; 
Fem: feminine, cooperation oriented, low value of MAS; 
LTO: long term oriented, high value of LTO; 
STO: short term oriented, low value of LTO. 
2)Out-group partner can become in-group by repetitive 
confirmation of relation 
3)qa and ra are relative to the weight of economic value, which 
is set equal to 1. 
4)Also influenced indirectly, see equation (4). 
Table 1 presents qualitative directions for the influence 
of cultural dimensions on parameters in the agent 
negotiation model. However, it is based on a narrative 
analysis. Data to quantify the influence or to assess the 
influence of the dimensions relative to each other is not 
available. Until evidence is available, a simple model 
can be assumed, giving all dimensions equal influence.  
Equations that have been implemented for the test runs 
presented in the next section of this paper are given 
below.  The principle applied in combining the 
dimensions, is that in both positive and negative 
direction of influence, the cultural influence having the 
maximal value determines the extent of the parameter. 
Negotiation parameters are modified for culture by 
equations (2…7), where pa, ua, ia, ma, and la represent 
agent a’s cultural dimensions, i.e. the Hofstede indices 
scaled to the interval [0…1]; sa and sp represent a’s and 
partner’s status; dap is group difference, valued 0 or 1. 
weight of quality: 
w’apQ = qa [1 + max{√( pasa), ua, ma, 1-la} 
- max {1-√(pasa), 1-ma, la}] 
(2) 
weight of risk: 
        w’apR = ra [1 +  
max{pa (sp-sa), ua(1+dap), (1-ia)dap, ma,1-la} 
- (sa-sp)] 
(3) 
The weight of rational economic value w’apP = 1 . w’apQ 
and w’apR are measured relative to w’apP . These three 
factors are normalized in order to add up to 1 as weights 
wapP, wapQ, and wapR in equation (1). 
concession factor: 
cap = γa + 0.5(1- γa ) max{pa (sa-sp), (1-ia)(1-dap)} (4) 
Where za represents the maximal value of the 
normalized risk function R(b,a) in equation 1. In the 
model presented in this paper there is no other risk than 
the risk of defection by the supplier; za reflects the 
information asymmetry: za = 1 if a acts as a customer 
and 0 ≤ za ≤ 0.25, depending on a’s  probability to 
defect, if a acts as a supplier. 
negotiation speed: 
bap = max[0.1, βa{1 + max(ma ,  ua ) 
 - max(1- ma , dap-iadap)}] 
(5) 
utility gap size: 
ga p= νa{1 + x pa max(0, sp-sa)} (6) 
where x is the round number in the current negotiation. 
Impatience factor: 
 hap = pia [1 + max(ma ,  ua ) -  
max{pa(sp-sa), (1-ia)(1-dap), 1-ma, la, (1-la)(sp-sa)}] 
(7) 
TEST RUNS 
Table 2 presents results of negotiations performed in the 
environment developed  for simulation of commercial 
transactions, applied by Hofstede et al. (2008, 2008abc). 
Trade agents are assigned roles of either suppliers or 
customers. They may select a partner in the opposite 
role and negotiate about the sale of a commodity that 
has either high or basic quality. However, the quality is 
not visible without third-party testing, so the buyer has 
to accept a risk, i.e. has to trust the partner. In the 
current simulation, agents are set to be neutral with 
respect to trust, i.e. neither trust nor distrust their trade 
partners. If they agree on high quality, they implicitly 
accept the risk of deceit. 
Table 2: Results of simulated negotiations for extreme 
settings of culture parameters, i.e. the value for the particular 
dimension is set to either 0.1 or 0.9, the values for the other 
dimensions are set to 0.5. Parameters qa, ra, γa, βa, νa, and pia 
are set to the typical values presented in table 1. 
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40 
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35 
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3.2 
 
3.3 
3.1 
 
24 
0 
 
25 
25 
Egal  58 56 49 3.2 2 
U.av Partner is: 
- different 
- similar 
 
39 
65 
 
85 
46 
 
69 
41 
 
2.6 
2.9 
 
0 
22 
U.tol  48 76 61 2.9 1 
Indiv  56 63 53 3.0 0 
Coll Partner: 
- in-group  
- out-group 
 
81 
35 
 
23 
77 
 
22 
69 
 
3.4 
3.1 
 
14 
0 
Mas  57 55 49 3.0 18 
Femi  48 43 47 3.7 10 
LTO  71 27 28 3.6 16 
STO 
- high status buyer 
40 
68 
72 
51 
64 
43 
3.1 
3.0 
13 
13 
1) see footnote Table 1  
As a first comment to Table 2 it should be noted that the 
results are not tuned to realistic situations. The figures 
should not be taken as absolute values. They show 
tendencies that emerge from the model.  
The results in Table 2 show that in a hierarchical agent 
society, negotiations succeed more frequently if there is 
status difference: the higher ranking force the 
transaction and take risk (high rate of high quality 
transactions) or force the lower ranking to do so.  
Egalitarian agents do not accept the risk of deceit. 
In uncertainty avoiding agent societies, negotiations fail 
frequently if the partner is different, i.e. partners do not 
have common group membership. Negotiations are 
broken off after a few rounds, because the uncertainty 
avoiding agents have an urge to proceed (“time is 
money”). They have a strong preference for high quality 
commodities. They are willing to take a calculated risk 
to that end, but only with familiar partners.  The 
uncertainty tolerant agents are more balanced in their 
judgement of transaction value and risk.  
Individualistic agents also do not accept proposals that 
have to little value or too much risk. Collectivistic 
agents fail more frequently if they negotiate with out-
group partners. With in-group partners, they take their 
time to negotiate and accept the risk of deceit.  
Masculine agents are impatient, break-off frequently, 
and go for high quality. Feminine agents try to finish the 
negotiations and take their time for it. Nevertheless, 
they do not succeed more frequently, because the step 
size of their concessions is too small. 
Long term oriented agents show patience in their 
negotiations and frequently succeed, but they do not 
accept risk. Yet they accept high quality transactions,  
because they take their time to negotiate a price that 
covers the risk. The sort term oriented are less patient 
and break off more frequently, but this effect is reduced  
when they trade with high status partners. They accept 
risk if they are trading high quality products. 
These result comply with the expected behaviour of the 
agents and verify the implementation. However, they do 
not validate that the implemented model generates 
believable culturally differentiated agent behaviour. 
For validation of the model, results of extensive 
simulations with realistic values of cultural parameters 
should be compared with empirical results from 
literature. A host of literature on negotiation in 
particular countries is available, for instance Adair et al. 
(2004) compare negotiations  in France, Russia, Japan, 
Hong Kong, Brazil, and the United States; Kumar and 
Worm (2004) compare negotiations in China and India. 
The remaining part of this section presents an example 
of data generated by the model. An agent society of 8 
suppliers and 8 customers is given time to trade and 
negotiate about approximately 100 transactions. All 
suppliers have equal cultural settings and all customers 
have equal settings. If agents have equal cultural 
settings, they are considered in-group. All agents have 
equal status. Table 3 displays the cultural settings. 
Culture 1 is modelled after North-American cultures,  
culture 2 is inspired by China, culture 3 by East-
European cultures and culture 4 has similarity with 
India. Table 4 presents results of the simulations. 
Table 3: Example cultures used in simulations. 
culture pa ua ia ma la  
1 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.3 
2 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.9 
3 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 
4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 
 
Table 4: Example results of a simulation run with typical 
parameter settings from Table 1 and cultures from Table 3. 
Customer culture  
Variable 
Supplier 
culture 1 2 3 4  
Successful transactions 
 1 61 45 37 69 
 2 65 90 37 53 
 3 49 56 59 63 
 4 58 61 39 69 
Percentage failed 
 1 49 57 69 43 
 2 45 17 70 41 
 3 61 47 51 41 
 4 41 41 66 32 
Performance 1) 
 1  0.00 0.08 0.05 
 2 0.06  0.09 0.10 
 3 0.02 -0.07  0.02 
 4 0.11 0.05 0.07  
1) Performance is computed as average normalized price 
minus average normalized quality. A high value is an 
advantage for the suppliers; a low value is advantage for the 
customers. 
 
The results demonstrate that in the simulation model, 
the cultural dimension parameters have their influence. 
They differentiate aggregate performance in 
monocultural settings as well as intercultural 
interactions.  However, extensive validation is required 
on the basis of culture and negotiation literature. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Negotiation can be approached as a rational process of 
collaborative decision making, as advocated by Raiffa 
(2002). However, it is observed that negotiation 
outcomes differ across the world and that people from 
different countries differ with respect to the way they 
negotiate and the results they obtain (Gelfand and Brett, 
2004). As to all forms of negotiations, this applies to 
business negotiations and the bargaining about 
commercial transactions. Kumar and Worm (2004) 
relate differences in business negotiation processes  
with differences in economic institutions. According to 
Hofstede (2001), the efficiency of different 
organizational structures and institutions depend on 
culture. So, there is ubiquitous evidence that the result 
of decision making in business is influenced by the 
cultural background of the decision makers. As a 
consequence, realistic business simulation models of 
international supply chains and networks that take the 
interaction between business partners into account, 
should incorporate culture.  
This paper contributes to the understanding of culture’s 
influence on decision making in business by exploring 
the feasibility of Hofstede’s five-dimensional model for 
simulating believable agents in business. The model has 
been tested on  imaginary cultures that differ on only 
one of the dimensions.  Furthermore, preliminary results 
of the simulation of more complex, reality-based 
cultures give evidence that culture in agents can be 
simulated by applying Hofstede’s model, as suggested 
by de Rosis et al. (2004). Extensive validations remain 
for future research. 
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